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Recently, dimensionality testing of a quantum state has received extensive attention (Ac´ın et al.
Phys. Rev. Letts. 2006, Scarani et al. Phys. Rev. Letts. 2006). Security proofs of existing quantum
information processing protocols rely on the assumption about the dimension of quantum states in
which logical bits are encoded. However, removing such assumption may cause security loophole.
In the present paper, we show that this is indeed the case. We choose two players’ quantum private
query protocol by Yang et al. (Quant. Inf. Process. 2014) as an example and show how one player
can gain an unfair advantage by changing the dimension of subsystem of a shared quantum system.
To resist such attack we propose dimensionality testing in a different way. Our proposal is based
on CHSH like game. As we exploit CHSH like game, it can be used to test if the states are product
states for which the protocol becomes completely vulnerable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Testing the dimension of a quantum state has generated a lot of interest recently [1, 2]. Existing quantum in-
formation related protocols presume the dimension of the system involved. Removing such assumption may result
into security loophole. For example, in a QKD protocol, if one encodes photon polarisation, one must be sure that
other properties of the photon, such as spectral line, spatial mode or temporal mode etc. do not change as well [3].
Extra dimensions may carry side-channel information that can be exploited by an eavesdropper. It may happen that
the manufacturer of the encryption device herself/himself uses this to insert a security backdoor. Thus it has redi-
rected the thoughts to derive bounds for the security proofs of quantum information processing protocols on weaker
constraints, i.e., removing the trustworthiness regarding the dimension of the system.
In this direction, detection of the dimension of an unknown quantum system based on a set of conditional prob-
abilities have become a prominent research area [4–6]. Successful experimental tests are also carried out for testing
dimension of a quantum system [7, 8]. However, all these attempts are proposed in a prepare-measurement set up
with/without the aid of dimension witnesses [9, 10].
In this paper we develop a CHSH like game which helps in determining the degrees of freedom of the subsystems
of an entangled bipartite system. We consider a shared entangled state of the form
|Ψ〉BA =
1√
2
(|0〉B |φ0〉A + |1〉B |φ1〉A). (1)
N many states of this form are shared between two legitimate parties Bob and Alice where 〈φ0|φ1〉A 6= 0. Here,
{|0〉B , |1〉B} denote the computational basis for Bob’s qubits and |φl〉A , l = 0, 1 denotes qutrits with two degrees of
freedom at the place of Alice. Precisely, by the words “two degrees of freedom of a qutrit” we try to convey that the
qutrit |φ〉l is in the span of {|i〉A , |j〉A}, i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. That is, the state is the superposition of any two basis vectors
out of the three. The subscripts A and B stand for Alice and Bob respectively.
The dimension testing problem which we consider in this paper certifies whether both |φ0〉A , |φ1〉A are lying in
the same subspace of C3 or in different subspaces of C3. Explicitly, the game certifies if |φ0〉A and |φ1〉A are the
superposition of same {|i〉A , |j〉A} or the values of i, j differ for the states. We solve the problem by defining a CHSH
like game. The proposed game is based on a function which generally familiar as embedded XOR function [11]. We
calculate the winning probability of the game for product and entangled states. We notice that the winning probability
of the game differs for product state from entangled one. We also notice that if the sub-systems of the entangled pair
are not in the same Hilbert space then the winning probability changes abruptly. Observing this success probability
one can certify if the states are in a desired form.
This dimension detection problem is motivated by the following reason. Many quantum information retrieval
protocols exploit entangled states of the form (1) to establish a secret key between two legitimate partners Bob and
∗ arpita76b@gmail.com
† bibhas.adhikari@gmail.com
‡ tapisatya@gmail.com
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
08
17
2v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
5 N
ov
 20
18
2Alice. Such a protocol typically starts with sending out a sequence of subsystems of the bipartite systems from Bob
to Alice. After sending the states to Alice, Bob measures his qubits sequentially in {|0〉B , |1〉B} basis, whereas Alice
measures her qubits either in {|φ0〉A ,
∣∣φ⊥0 〉A} basis or in {|φ1〉A , ∣∣φ⊥1 〉A} basis randomly. If the measurement result
of Alice gives
∣∣φ⊥0 〉, she concludes that the raw key bit at Bob’s end must be 1. If it is ∣∣φ⊥1 〉, the raw key bit must be
0. Bob and Alice execute classical post-processing so that Alice’s information on the key reduces to one bit or more.
Bob knows the whole key, whereas Alice generally knows several bits of the key. For example, in the quantum private
query protocol due to Yang et al. [12], if we set |φ0〉A = cos ( θ2 ) |0〉 + sin ( θ2 ) |1〉 and |φ1〉A = cos ( θ2 ) |0〉 − sin ( θ2 ) |1〉 ,
0 < θ < pi/2, then it can be shown that the success probability of Alice to guess a bit in the raw key becomes 12 sin
2 θ.
Now, if Bob has lack of resources to generate |Ψ〉AB and he borrows the states from a third party, say Charlie, then
the situation would be different. In fact, if Alice is mistrustful and has a tie with Charlie, then there may exist a
possibility that the states |φl〉A , l = 0, 1 are not qubits. Rather, the states |φl〉A may be of higher dimensional which
may benefit Alice. We show that this is indeed possible and thus the key generation in quantum private query protocol
(QPQ) proposed by Yang et al. is insecure without the certification of the dimension of the Alice’s sub-system.
In order to acquire knowledge about the dimension of Alice’s particle, Bob needs to perform certain quantum
measurements. Since the dimension of Alice’s state is unknown to Bob and he has to devise measurement operators
for detecting whether it is a qubit or qutrit, we consider Orbital Angular Momentum (OAM) along with the state of
polarization of a photon. In case of qutrit, we define two bases. In one basis, we consider |0〉 = |H,+m〉, |1〉 = |V,+m〉
and |2〉 = |H,−m〉 and in another basis we consider |0〉 = |H,+m〉, |1〉 = |V,+m〉 and |2〉 = |V,−m〉; where H (V )
denotes horizontal (vertical) polarization and m = ±1 stands for orbital angular momentum (OAM) of a photon.
Bob switches over these two bases randomly. The reason of such switching is discussed in section III. The motivation
of defining the basis vectors in this way is to show that the proposed methodology is not practically impossible. In
this regard, one may wonder why we consider qutrit but not a ququart which covers the whole space of dimension
4. We observe that even using a qutrit the cheater may gain sufficiently. This motivates us to deal with qutrits as
the cheater has no incentive to go for another extra dimension, i.e., for quart when he/she already gains from lower
dimension.
We observe if Alice’s subsystems remain in the same subspace of C3, i.e., if Alice’s subsystems are the superposition
of {|0〉 , |1〉} or {|1〉 , |2〉} or {|0〉 , |2〉}, then the protocol by Yang et al. maintains the same success probability
described above. However, if Alice’s subsystems are in two different subspaces the situation alters. In this case, Alice
may achieve greater success probability for small values of θ. Thus Bob has to apply his measurement operators for
detection the subspaces of Alice’s qutrits. Note that this situation never arises if Alice’s subsystem will be a qubit
as there is no possibility for different subspaces. That is why the certification test performed by Bob at his place is
named as “dimensionality testing”.
Moreover, the procedure we exploit for dimension certification in the above mentioned protocol can also detect a
more powerful attack as follows. In this attack model Charlie may supply N product states of the form |l〉B |φl〉A,
where l ∈ {0, 1}, to Bob. At the same time he provides the full information of l to Alice. As Bob measures his
states only in {|0〉 , |1〉} basis, Alice gets the full information about the raw key. Though such type of attack was
not considered in [13], however, the methodology they used certifies automatically if the states are entangled and
hence remove the possibility of such attack. We show that the CHSH like game proposed in the paper is capable of
defending such an attack.
One should note that our methodology is designed for one server and one client model. This does not consider one
server and multi-clients situation where a cheater uses a scheme which will provide exactly as much information for
the ordinary clients as they are entitled to (otherwise he will be caught very soon), and only the favoured clients, who
know the scheme may profit. Here, the favoured client Alice ties up with the third party Charlie to cheat Bob (the
server).
The contribution and organization of this paper are as follows. In Section II, we define a qubit-qutrit entangled
state |Ψ〉BA which guarantees higher success probability to Alice to guess a bit in the raw key for the QPQ protocol
proposed by Yang et al. In Section III, we develop a CHSH like game for detection of dimension of Alice’s subsystem,
rather it is more appropriate to say, a CHSH game for detection of the subspaces of Alice’s subsystems. We also
propose a set up for generating |Ψ〉BA by exploiting the existing quantum logic gates defined for C3 in section IV.
II. QUBIT-QUTRIT ENTANGLED STATE
In this section we show how the success probability for guessing a raw key bit in the key generation protocol
proposed by Yang et al. gets influenced if we replace qubit-qubit entangled state with a qubit-qutrit entangled state.
3Let us consider equation (1)
|Ψ〉BA =
1√
2
(|0〉B |φ0〉A + |1〉B |φ1〉A)
where,
|φ0〉A = cos γ cos δ |i〉+ (cos θ sin δ − sin θ sin γ cos δ) |i+ 1〉
+ (sin θ sin δ + cos θ sin γ cos δ) |i+ 2〉
|φ1〉A = (cos θ sin δ − sin θ sin γ cos δ) |i〉+ cos γ cos δ |i+ 1〉
− (sin θ sin δ + cos θ sin γ cos δ) |i+ 2〉 ,
where, |i+ j〉 =⇒ |i+ j mod 3〉, i, j = {0, 1, 2} and 0 ≤ θ, γ, δ ≤ pi/2. Note that |φ0〉A and |φ1〉A need not be
orthogonal.
Now we discuss the key generation protocol [12] using this shared qubit-qutrit entangled state. After shar-
ing the states, Bob measures his qubits in {|0〉B , |1〉B} basis, whereas Alice measures her qutrits either in{|φ0〉A , |φ′0〉A , |φ′′0〉A} basis or in {|φ1〉A , |φ′1〉A , |φ′′1〉A} basis randomly, where,
|φ′0〉A = − cos γ sin δ |i〉+ (sin θ sin γ sin δ + cos θ cos δ) |i+ 1〉
+ (sin θ cos δ − sin δ cos θ sin γ) |i+ 2〉 ,
|φ′′0〉A = − sin γ |i〉 − sin θ cos γ |i+ 1〉
+ cos θ cos γ |i+ 2〉 ,
|φ′1〉A = (sin θ sin γ sin δ + cos θ cos δ) |i〉 − cos γ sin δ |i+ 1〉
− (sin θ cos δ − sin δ cos θ sin γ) |i+ 2〉 ,
|φ′′1〉A = − sin θ cos γ |i〉 − sin γ |i+ 1〉
− cos θ cos γ |i+ 2〉 .
If the measurement outcome of Alice is |φ′0〉 or |φ′′0〉, she concludes that the raw key bit at Bob’s end is 1. If it is
|φ′1〉 or |φ′′1〉, the raw key bit is 0. In this case, the success probability of Alice when Bob measures |0〉 becomes
Pr(A = 0, B = 0) = Pr(B = 0) Pr(A = 0|B = 0)
=
1
2
[Pr(A = φ′1|B = 0) + Pr(A = φ′′1 |B = 0)]
=
1
2
[
(sin θ sin γ cos γ sin 2δ
+ cos θ cos γ cos 2δ − sin θ cos θ sin γ cos 2δ
− sin2 θ sin δ cos δ + cos2 θ sin2 γ sin δ cos δ)2
+ (sin θ cos δ cos 2γ + cos θ sin γ sin δ
+ sin θ cos θ cos γ sin δ + cos2 θ sin γ cos γ cos δ)2
]
.
Similarly, the success probability of Alice when Bob measures |1〉 is given by
Pr(A = 1, B = 1) =
1
2
[
(sin θ sin γ cos γ sin 2δ
+ cos θ cos γ cos 2δ − sin θ cos θ sin γ cos 2δ
− sin2 θ sin δ cos δ + cos2 θ sin2 γ sin δ cos δ)2
+ (sin θ cos δ cos 2γ + cos θ sin γ sin δ
+ sin θ cos θ cos γ sin δ + cos2 θ sin γ cos γ cos δ)2
]
.
4Hence the total success probability of Alice to guess a bit correctly can be calculated as follows
Pr(A = B) =
1
2
.[Pr(A = φ′1|B = 0) + Pr(A = φ′′1 |B = 0)]
+
1
2
.[Pr(A = φ′0|B = 1) + Pr(A = φ′′0 |B = 1)]
= [Pr(A = φ′0|B = 1) + Pr(A = φ′′0 |B = 1)]
= (sin θ sin γ cos γ sin 2δ + cos θ cos γ cos 2δ
− sin θ cos θ sin γ cos 2δ − sin2 θ sin δ cos δ
+ cos2 θ sin2 γ sin δ cos δ)2 + (sin θ cos δ cos 2γ
+ cos θ sin γ sin δ + sin θ cos θ cos γ sin δ
+ cos2 θ sin γ cos γ cos δ)2.
If we put δ = pi/2, the success probability of Alice to guess a key bit correctly becomes cos2 θ(1+sin2 θ) = 1− sin4 θ
for any 0 ≤ θ, γ ≤ pi/2.
The success probabilities are drawn in Figure. 1 both for the qubit-qubit and qubit-qutrit (for δ = pi/2) entangled
states. Note that when qubit-qutrit entangled pairs are exploited, Alice gains (in terms of probability) for any value
of θ ranging from 0 to 1.1 (approximately). This observation demands Bob to verify and test the dimension of the
quantum particle shared with Alice.
FIG. 1: Success probability for Yang’s QPQ protocol for qubit-qubit and qubit-qutrit (setting δ = pi
2
) shared entangled state
In this regard one may argue that for large value of θ ∈ {0, pi2 } Alice can gain larger probability value and hence
large number of raw key bits than what she is entitled for. Thus Charlie might not change the dimension of Alice’s
subsystem, rather he manipulates the value of θ. This type of cheating can be easily detected by exploiting the
methodology of [13]. However, if Charlie changes the dimension of the system in the motivation to favour Alice, Bob
can not detect the attack by the existing methodology of [13] and hence the proposed attack remains undetected for
a given value of θ.
We now show that if Alice’s subsystems are lying in same sub-space of C3, the success probability remains same as
the success probability of qubit-qubit system. Let us consider
|Φ〉BA =
1√
2
(|0〉B |φ0〉A + |1〉B |φ1〉A)
where,
|φ0〉A = cos
θ
2
|i〉+ sin θ
2
|i+ 1〉
|φ1〉A = cos
θ
2
|i〉 − sin θ
2
|i+ 1〉 ,
5and 0 < θ < pi/2, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Note that if Bob’s particle is measured in {|0〉B , |1〉B} basis then the state of Alice’s
particle lies in one of the fundamental two dimensional subspaces of C3. Now we determine the success probability of
Alice to guess a bit of the raw key as follows.
Proceeding a similar way described by Yang et al. [12], first Bob measures his qubits in {|0〉B , |1〉B} basis. If Bob
obtains |0〉B or |1〉B , Alice’s state becomes |φ0〉A or |φ1〉A respectively. Now let Alice performs measurements on her
particle using the bases A0 = {|φ0〉A , |φ′0〉A , |φ′′0〉A} and A1 = {|φ1〉A , |φ′1〉A , |φ′′1〉A}, choosing one of them uniformly
at random, where |φ′l〉A is in the superposition of |i〉 , |i+ 1〉 and orthogonal to |φl〉A and |φ′′l 〉A. If Bob obtains |0〉B
and Alice chooses A0, she shall get |φ0〉A with probability 1 and never gets |φ′0〉A , |φ′′0〉A ; whereas if she chooses A1,
she shall obtain |φ1〉A with probability cos2 θ otherwise |φ′1〉A with probability sin2 θ and never gets |φ′′1〉A . This is
because
|φ0〉A = cos θ |φ1〉A + sin θ |φ′1〉A .
Now we summarize the conditional probabilities in the following table, where B = 0, 1 means Bob gets |0〉B and |1〉B
respectively.
B = 0 B = 1
A = |φ0〉A 12 12 cos2 θ
A = |φ′0〉A 0 12 sin2 θ
A = |φ′′0〉A 0 0
A = |φ1〉A 12 cos2 θ 12
A = |φ′1〉A 12 sin2 θ 0
A = |φ′′1〉A 0 0
We define the rule to determine the key as follows. If Alice gets |φ′0〉A, she outputs 1, and when she gets |φ′1〉A, she
outputs 0. Thus, the success probability of Alice to guess a bit in raw key can be written as
Pr(A = B) = Pr(A = 0, B = 0) + Pr(A = 1, B = 1)
= Pr(B = 0) Pr(A = 0|B = 0) + Pr(B = 1) Pr(A = 1|B = 1)
=
1
2
Pr(A = φ⊥1 |B = 0) +
1
2
Pr(A = φ⊥0 |B = 1)
=
sin2 θ
2
.
Thus we conclude that the proposed qubit-qutrit state |Φ〉BA provides the same success probability when the state
of Alice’s shared particle is in one of the fundamental subspaces of C3. This result facilitates us to define a set of
measurement operators for Bob who can test whether Alice’s qutrit is in the desired space. Once a dimension test
determines that |φ0〉A and |φ1〉A are lying in the same two dimensional subspace of C3, Yang et al. protocol can be
continued for key generation with the shared entangled state of the form of eqn (1).
III. CHSH LIKE GAME FOR DIMENSIONALITY TESTING
In this section we propose a methodology to determine if the states of Alice’s particles, |φ0〉A , |φ1〉A (see equation
(1)) are in the superposition of same orthonormal states {|i〉A , |j〉A}, i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, or in the superposition of different
orthonormal states. For example, one is the superposition of {|0〉 , |2〉} and another is the superposition of {|1〉 , |2〉}
and so on. Exploiting the methodology described here we also can certify if the shared states are product states.
In our context, Bob performs a CHSH like game to detect the dimensionality of Alice’s subsystem at his place.
We should emphasize again that why we call this “dimensionality testing”. This is because if Alice’s system is qubit,
then there will be no possibility to lie the subsystems of Alice in two different subspaces. This only happens when we
consider higher dimension.
Similar to the standard CHSH game, we require two black boxes as initial set up. One box is labeled as X whereas
another is labeled as Y . Note that here Bob possesses both the boxes. Like the CHSH game, we assume that during
the game, the boxes do not communicate among themselves. Box X can take an input x ∈ {0, 1} and box Y can take
another input y ∈ {0, 1}. After taking the inputs, X produces a bit a ∈ {0, 1} and Y produces a trit b ∈ {0, 1, 2}. We
now define a function f(a, b) such that f(a, b) = 1 if a 6= b and f(a, b) = 0 if a = b.
The game will win if and only if f(a, b) = x ∧ y. For classical deterministic strategy the winning probability of
the game is 34 . However, the winning probability differs if we assume that the boxes share some quantum states
6between themselves. In the following subsections we will show how it differs for product state, entangled state with
sub-systems lying in same subspaces of dimension 3 and entangled state with sub-systems lying in different subspaces
of dimension 3.
A. Winning probability for product states
Consider, Bob gets N product states from Charlie. Let among these N states, N2 states are of the form |0〉 |φ0〉
and remaining N2 are of the form |1〉 |φ1〉, where |φ0〉 = cos θ2 |i〉 + sin θ2 |i+ 1〉 and |φ1〉 = cos θ2 |i〉 − sin θ2 |i+ 1〉,
i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and |i+ 1〉 = |i+ 1 mod 3〉. From these N states, Bob chooses n states uniformly at random. He then
fixes a quantum strategy as follows.
If x = 0, X measures the 1st particle in {|0〉 , |1〉} basis, if it is 1, the particle is measured in {|+〉 , |−〉} basis, where
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). If the measurement result would be |0〉 or |+〉, X outputs 0. If the
measurement result would be |1〉 or |−〉, X outputs 1.
If y = 0, Y measures the 2nd particle in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 , |2′〉} basis, if it is 1, the particle is measured in {|0′′〉 , |1′′〉 , |2′′〉}
basis, where |0′〉 = 1√
2
(cos pi8 |i〉 + sin pi8 |i+ 1〉), |1′〉 = 1√2 (sin pi8 |i〉 − cos pi8 |i+ 1〉), |2′〉 = |i+ 2〉 and |0′′〉 =
1√
2
(cos 3pi8 |i〉 + sin 3pi8 |i+ 1〉), |1′′〉 = 1√2 (sin 3pi8 |i〉 − cos 3pi8 |i+ 1〉), |2′′〉 = |i+ 2〉; |i+ 2〉 = |i+ 2 mod 3〉. If the
measurement result would be |0′〉 or |0′′〉, Y outputs 0. If the measurement result would be |1′〉 or |1′′〉, Y outputs 1.
If it is |2′〉 or |2′′〉, Y outputs 2.
In this case, winning probability becomes
Pr(f(a, b) = x ∧ y) = Pr((x, y) = (0, 0) & ((a, b) = (0, 0) or (1, 1)))
+ Pr((x, y) = (0, 1) & ((a, b) = (0, 0) or (1, 1)))
+ Pr((x, y) = (1, 0) & ((a, b) = (0, 0) or (1, 1)))
+ Pr((x, y) = (1, 1) & ((a, b) = (0, 1) or (0, 2)
or (1, 0) or (1, 2)))
From Figure I of appendix, we get Pr(f(a, b) = x ∧ y) = 12 (1 + 12√2 sin θ).
B. Winning probability for entangled state with sub-systems lying in same subspaces
Let Bob gets N entangled pairs of the form 1√
2
(|0〉 |φ0〉+ |1〉 |φ1〉), where |φ0〉 = cos θ2 |i〉+ sin θ2 |i+ 1〉 and |φ1〉 =
cos θ2 |i〉 − sin θ2 |i+ 1〉 from Charlie. He then chooses n states among these N entangled pairs uniformly at random
and follows the quantum strategy as described above. In such a case, the winning probability Pr(f(a, b) = x ∧ y)
becomes 12 (1 +
1
2
√
2
+ 1
2
√
2
sin θ) (Figure II of appendix).
C. Winning probability for entangled states with subsystem lying in different subspaces
Let Bob gets N entangled pairs of the form 1√
2
(|0〉 |φ0〉 + |1〉 |φ1〉), where |φ0〉 = cos θ |i+ 1〉 + sin θ |i+ 2〉 and
|φ1〉 = cos θ |i〉 − sin θ |i+ 2〉 from Charlie. Bob then chooses n states from these N states randomly. If Bob decides
to follow the same strategy as described above, the winning probability Pr(f(a, b) = x ∧ y) becomes 14 (1 + cos2 θ)
(Figure III of appendix).
Thus, observing the winning probability of the game Bob can differentiate if the states are product states, entangled
with sub-systems lying in same subspaces or entangled with sub-systems lying in different subspaces. Figure 2 shows
the winning probabilities with varying θ for the above three cases.
From Figure 2, it can be easily seen that the winning probability of the game while using the entangled state with
subsystem lying in the same subspace exceeds the classical winning probability 34 , for most of the values of θ. On the
other hand, the winning probability of the game is always less than 34 when product state and the entangled state
with subsystem lying in different subspaces are used in the protocol.
It is mandatory to mention here that for each case, for half of the particle-pairs, we consider {|0〉 , |1〉 , |2〉} as
{|H,+1〉 , |V,+1〉 , |H,−1〉} and for half of the particle-pairs we consider {|0〉 , |1〉 , |2〉} as {|H,+1〉 , |V,+1〉 , |V,−1〉}.
7FIG. 2: red curve: Winning probability (WP) of tilted CHSH game with θ for product states (P ); green curve: WP for
entangled state with sub-systems lying in same subspace (E1); blue curve: WP for entangled state with sub-systems lying in
different subspaces (E2)
This is because Bob does not know which encoding has been used by Charlie. So it is possible that Charlie exploits
{|H,+1〉 , |V,+1〉 , |V,−1〉} basis and Bob uses {|H,+1〉 , |V,+1〉 , |H,−1〉} basis. In such case, Bob gets the probability
similar to qubit-qubit case i.e., when Alice’s subsystems lie in same subspace of C3, hence gets deceived easily. However,
if Bob switches between {|H,+1〉 , |V,+1〉 , |H,−1〉} basis and {|H,+1〉 , |V,+1〉 , |V,−1〉} basis randomly, he will detect
the dimension of Alice’s subsystem successfully.
Hence, after getting the entangled states from a third party vendor, say Charlie, Bob chooses n entangled states
randomly. Then he performs above mentioned dimensionality testing with these randomly chosen n states. If the
proposed test certifies that |φ0〉A and |φ1〉A are in the desired subspaces, Bob goes for QPQ protocol with remaining
states.
In this regard, one may wonder if instead of testing the states locally, this dimensionality test can be performed
non-locally. In that case, the game should be defined as follows. Charlie (the third party) supplies the qubit-qutrit
states to Bob and Alice respectively. Bob then randomly chooses a fraction of the supplied states and tells Alice
to play the game for those states. Depending on the outcome of the game Bob decides if they further proceed for
quantum private query phase.
In the proposed protocol, Bob has to switch over two bases. So in case of non-local game Alice has to inform
when to choose what basis. Like Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), one may discuss the bases after measurement.
However, unlike QKD, QPQ is considered as a mistrustful cryptography. In QPQ Alice may behave as a malicious
party. So it should not be expected from her to communicate the true value of the output. Moreover, she might not
be forced to measure the particles in the defined bases. She may choose some other bases which may replicate the
probability value. The detail analysis regarding the security in case of non-local game is out of scope for the current
paper. This might be our future research goal.
We present our proposed algorithm for dimensionality testing in Algorithm 1.
In the following section we explain how is it possible to create such an entangled pair defined in eqn (1) exploiting
quantum gates defined for C3.
IV. PREPARATION OF QUBIT-QUTRIT ENTANGLED SYSTEM USING QUANTUM LOGIC GATES
In this section, we propose how to generate qubit-qutrit entangled pair using quantum logic gates.
Assume that both the qubit and qutrit are initially in a vacuum mode and the initial qubit-qutrit state is given by
|µ〉BA = |0〉B ⊗ |0〉A .
8Algorithm 1 Our Proposed protocol for dimensionality testing
1. Bob starts with n number of entangled states chosen randomly from N number of entangled states supplied by a third
party vendor.
2. For rounds i ∈ {1, · · · , n}
(a) Bob chooses xi ∈ {0, 1} and yi ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
(b) If xi = 0, he measures the first particle of the entangled state in {|0〉 , |1〉} basis and if xi = 1, he measures that in
{|+〉 , |−〉} basis (defined above).
(c) Similarly, if yi = 0, Bob measures the second particle of the entangled state in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 , |2′〉} basis and if yi = 1,
he measures that in {|0′′〉 , |1′′〉 , |2′′〉} basis (defined above).
(d) The output is recorded as ai ∈ {0, 1} and bi ∈ {0, 1, 2} for the first and the second particle respectively. The
encoding for ai(bi) is as follows.
• For the first particle of each pair, ai = 0 if the measurement result is |0〉 or |+〉; it is 1 if the result is |1〉 or |−〉.
• For the second particle of each pair, bi = 0 if the measurement result is |0′〉 or |0′′〉; it is 1, if the measurement
result is |1′〉 or |1′′〉; it is 2, if the measurement result is |2′〉 or |2′′〉.
(e) For the test round i = n, define
f(ai, bi) =
{
1 if ai 6= bi
0 if otherwise.
3. For i = n, define
Yi =
{
1 if f(ai, bi) = xi ∧ yi
0 if otherwise.
4. If 1
n
∑
i Yi <
1
2
(1 + 1
2
√
2
+ 1
2
√
2
sin θ), Bob aborts the protocol.
5. Conditioning on the event that the local CHSH test at Bob’s place has been successful, Bob proceeds for the private
query phase as described in [12].
Our goal is to use different quantum gates to generate entanglement in qubit-qutrit system which is initially in a
product state.
Recall that the rotation operator R for a qutrit system can be written as R = Rx(θ)Ry(γ)
Rz(δ) due to Euler decomposition, where Rx(θ), Ry(γ) and Rz(δ) denote the rotation operators about x-axis, y-axis
and z-axis respectively. The operators Rx(θ), Ry(γ) and Rz(δ) can be realized in experiment by optical elements such
as beam splitters and a pi-phase shifter.
Now define a unitary operator U which acts on the computational basis state of six dimensional Hilbert space such
that
U |00〉 = |00〉,
U |01〉 = |01〉,
U |02〉 = |02〉,
U |10〉 = |11〉,
U |11〉 = |10〉,
U |12〉 = −|12〉.
Therefore, the explicit form of the unitary operator is given by
U = |00〉〈00|+ |01〉〈01|+ |11〉〈10|+ |10〉〈11|+ |02〉〈02| − |12〉〈12|.
Now, the desired state of the form equation (1) can be obtained from |µ〉BA in two steps as follows.
• Apply the unitary operator H ⊗R on |µ〉BA such that we obtain |ω〉BA = (H ⊗R) |µ〉BA , where H denotes the
Hadamard gate for qubits.
• Apply the operator U on |ω〉BA to obtain |Ψ〉BA = U |ω〉BA .
9Indeed, by writing R in the computation basis, it is easy to verify that
|Ψ〉BA =
1√
2
(|0〉B ⊗ |φ0〉A + |1〉B ⊗ |φ1〉A),
where,
|φ0〉A = cos γ cos δ|0〉A + (cos θ sin δ − sin θ sin γ cos δ)|1〉A + (sin θ sin δ + cos θ sin γ cos δ)|2〉A
|φ1〉A = (cos θ sin δ − sin θ sin γ cos δ)|0〉A + cos γ cos δ|1〉A − (sin θ sin δ + cos θ sin γ cos δ)|2〉A.
V. CONCLUSION
Existing quantum information processing protocols assume a certain dimension of the system. It is intuitively
commented that removing such assumption may cause security flaw in quantum information tasking. However, till
date, no such protocol is found which can prove this conjecture. In the present draft, we find that there exist at least
one key generation protocol which suffers from the removal of such assumption. In this regard, we pick up quantum
private query protocol by Yang et al. and show how one party can gain more information than suggested by the
protocol by changing the dimension of his/her subsystem. In this initiative, we propose titled CHSH game to certify
the dimension of the subsystems of shared quantum system. Along with the certification of dimensionality, the game
is enable to certify if the states are entangled.
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Appendix A: Conditional probability for product state
Let us consider a situation where Charlie supplies N2 product states of the form |0〉 |φ0〉 and N2 product states of
the form |1〉 |φ1〉, where |φ0〉 = cos θ2 |i〉+ sin θ2 |i+ 1〉 and |φ1〉 = cos θ2 |i〉 − sin θ2 |i+ 1〉. Now, we analyze the case by
case scenario below.
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A. Case 1: (x=0, y=0)
In this case Bob randomly chooses n states from N states and measures his first particle in {|0〉 , |1〉} basis and
second particle in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 , |2′〉} basis. For 12 of the cases, for the first particle he obtains |0〉 with probability 1
and in that case the second particle will be |φ0〉. When he measures the second particle in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 , |2′〉} basis, he
obtains |0′〉 with probability 12 (cos θ2 cos pi8 + sin θ2 sin pi8 )2, |1′〉 with probability 12 (cos θ2 sin pi8 − sin θ2 cos pi8 )2. In such
case, he never gets |2′〉. Similarly, for 12 of the cases, Bob gets |1〉 with probability 1 and in that case the second
particle will be |φ1〉. When he measures the second particle in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 , |2′〉} basis, he obtains |0′〉 with probability
1
2 (cos
θ
2 cos
pi
8 − sin θ2 sin pi8 )2, |1′〉 with probability 12 (cos θ2 sin pi8 + sin θ2 cos pi8 )2 and never gets |2′〉.
B. Case 2: (x=0, y=1)
Bob measures his first particle in {|0〉 , |1〉} basis and second particle in {|0′′〉 , |1′′〉 ,
|2′′〉} basis. This case is similar to case 1. Conditional probabilities Pr(a, b|0, 1) are shown in figure I.
C. Case 3: (x=1, y=0)
Bob measures his first particle in {|+〉 , |−〉} basis and second particle in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 ,
|2′〉} basis. For the state of the form |0〉 |φ0〉, Bob obtains |+〉 with probability 12 and |−〉 with probability 12 . In both
the cases the second particle will be |φ0〉. For the state in form |1〉 |φ1〉, Bob obtains |+〉 with probability 12 and |−〉 with
probability 12 . And for both the cases the second particle will be |φ1〉. Thus, the conditional probability Pr(0, 0|1, 0) =
Pr(M = |0′〉 | |+〉 , |φ0〉)+Pr(M = |0′〉 | |+〉 , |φ1〉), Pr(0, 1|1, 0) = Pr(M = |1′〉 | |+〉 , |φ0〉)+Pr(M = |1′〉 | |+〉 , |φ1〉) and
Pr(0, 2|1, 0) = Pr(M = |2′〉 | |+〉 , |φ0〉) + Pr(M = |2′〉 | |+〉 , |φ1〉), where M is the measurement result for the second
particle. Similarly, the conditional probability Pr(1, 0|1, 0) = Pr(M = |0′〉 | |−〉 , |φ0〉) + Pr(M = |0′〉 | |−〉 , |φ1〉),
Pr(1, 1|1, 0) = Pr(M = |1′〉 | |−〉 , |φ0〉) + Pr(M = |1′〉 | |−〉 , |φ1〉) and Pr(1, 2|1, 0) = Pr(M = |2′〉 | |−〉 , |φ0〉) + Pr(M =
|2′〉 | |−〉 , |φ1〉). We accumulate all these conditional probabilities Pr(a, b|1, 0) in figure I.
D. Case 4: (x=1, y=1)
Bob measures his first particle in {|+〉 , |−〉} basis and second particle in {|0′′〉 , |1′′〉 ,
|2′′〉} basis. This case is similar to case 3. Conditional probabilities Pr(a, b|1, 1) are shown in figure I.
Appendix B: Conditional probability for entangled state with sub-systems lying in same subspace
Let us assume that Charlie supplies N entangled pairs of the form 1√
2
(|0〉 |φ0〉+ |1〉 |φ1〉), where |φ0〉 = cos θ2 |i〉+
sin θ2 |i+ 1〉 and |φ1〉 = cos θ2 |i〉 − sin θ2 |i+ 1〉. Now, we analyze the case by case scenario below.
E. Case 1: (x=0, y=0)
In this case Bob chooses n states uniformly at random from N states and measures his first particle in {|0〉 , |1〉}
basis and second particle in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 , |2′〉} basis. For the first particle he obtains |0〉 with probability 12 and in
this case the second particle collapses to |φ0〉. When Bob measures the second particle in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 , |2′〉} basis, he
obtains |0′〉 with probability 12 (cos θ2 cos pi8 + sin θ2 sin pi8 )2, |1′〉 with probability 12 (cos θ2 sin pi8 − sin θ2 cos pi8 )2 and never
gets |2′〉. Similarly, when Bob measures his first particle as |1〉, the second particle collapses to |φ1〉. In this case, the
probabilities of getting |0′〉, |1′〉 and |2′〉 are given in figure II.
F. Case 2: (x=0, y=1)
Bob measures his first particle in {|0〉 , |1〉} basis and second particle in {|0′′〉 , |1′′〉 ,
|2′′〉} basis. This case is similar to case 1. Conditional probabilities Pr(a, b|0, 1) are shown in figure II.
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TABLE I: Conditional probability of (a, b) given (x, y) for product states
(x, y) (a, b) Pr ((a, b) | (x, y))
(0, 0)
(0, 0) 1
2
(cos θ
2
cos pi
8
+ sin θ
2
sin pi
8
)2
(0, 1) 1
2
(cos θ
2
sin pi
8
− sin θ
2
cos pi
8
)2
(0, 2) 0
(1, 0) 1
2
(cos θ
2
cos pi
8
− sin θ
2
sin pi
8
)2
(1, 1) 1
2
(cos θ
2
sin pi
8
+ sin θ
2
cos pi
8
)2
(1, 2) 0
(0, 1)
(0, 0) 1
2
(cos θ
2
cos 3pi
8
+ sin θ
2
sin 3pi
8
)2
(0, 1) 1
2
(cos θ
2
sin 3pi
8
− sin θ
2
cos 3pi
8
)2
(0, 2) 0
(1, 0) 1
2
(cos θ
2
cos 3pi
8
− sin θ
2
sin 3pi
8
)2
(1, 1) 1
2
(cos θ
2
sin 3pi
8
+ sin θ
2
cos 3pi
8
)2
(1, 2) 0
(1, 0)
(0, 0) 1
2
(cos2 θ
2
cos2 pi
8
+ sin2 θ
2
cos2 pi
8
)
(0, 1) 1
2
(cos2 θ
2
sin2 pi
8
+ sin2 θ
2
cos2 pi
8
)
(0, 2) 0
(1, 0) 1
2
(cos2 θ
2
cos2 pi
8
+ sin2 θ
2
sin2 pi
8
)
(1, 1) 1
2
(cos2 θ
2
sin2 pi
8
+ sin2 θ
2
cos2 pi
8
)
(1, 2) 0
(1, 1)
(0, 0) 1
2
(cos2 θ
2
sin2 pi
8
+ sin2 θ
2
cos2 pi
8
)
(0, 1) 1
2
(cos2 θ
2
cos2 pi
8
+ sin2 θ
2
sin2 pi
8
)
(0, 2) 0
(1, 0) 1
2
(cos2 θ
2
sin2 pi
8
+ sin2 θ
2
cos2 pi
8
)
(1, 1) 1
2
(cos2 θ
2
cos2 pi
8
+ sin2 θ
2
sin2 pi
8
)
(1, 2) 0
G. Case 3: (x=1, y=0)
Bob measures his first particle in {|+〉 , |−〉} basis and second particle in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 ,
|2′〉} basis. When he measures the first particle in {|+〉 , |−〉} basis he gets |+〉 with probability cos2 θ2 and |−〉 with
probability sin2 θ2 . In the first case, the second particle collapses to |0〉. And in the second case, the second particle
collapses to |1〉. When Bob measures the second particle in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 , |2′〉} basis, |0′〉 is obtained with probability
cos2 pi8 , |1′〉 is obtained with probability sin2 pi8 and Bob never obtains |2′〉. Similarly, for |1〉, Bob obtains |0′〉 with
probability sin2 θ2 , |1′〉 with probability cos2 θ2 and never gets |2′〉. Conditional probabilities Pr(a, b|1, 0) are shown in
figure II.
H. Case 4: (x=1, y=1)
Bob measures his first particle in {|+〉 , |−〉} basis and second particle in {|0′′〉 , |1′′〉 ,
|2′′〉} basis. This case is similar to case 3. Conditional probabilities Pr(a, b|1, 1) are shown in figure II.
Appendix C: Conditional probability for entangled state with sub-systems lying in different subspace
Let us assume that Charlie supplies N entangled pairs of the form 1√
2
(|0〉 |φ0〉+ |1〉 |φ1〉), where |φ0〉 = cos θ |i+ 1〉+
sin θ |i+ 2〉 and |φ1〉 = cos θ |i〉 − sin θ |i+ 2〉. Now, we analyze the case by case scenario below.
I. Case 1: (x=0, y=0)
In this case Bob chooses n states among these N states uniformly at random and measures the first particle in
{|0〉 , |1〉} basis and second particle in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 , |2′〉} basis. For the first particle he obtains |0〉 with probability 12 and
in this case the second particle collapses to |φ0〉. When Bob measures the second particle in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 , |2′〉} basis, he
obtains |0′〉 with probability cos2 θ sin2 pi8 , |1′〉 with probability cos2 θ cos2 pi8 and |2′〉 with probability sin2 θ. Similarly,
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TABLE II: Conditional probability of (a, b) given (x, y) for entangled states with sub-systems in same space
(x, y) (a, b) Pr ((a, b) | (x, y))
(0, 0)
(0, 0) 1
2
(cos θ
2
cos pi
8
+ sin θ
2
sin pi
8
)2
(0, 1) 1
2
(cos θ
2
sin pi
8
− sin θ
2
cos pi
8
)2
(0, 2) 0
(1, 0) 1
2
(cos θ
2
cos pi
8
− sin θ
2
sin pi
8
)2
(1, 1) 1
2
(cos θ
2
sin pi
8
+ sin θ
2
cos pi
8
)2
(1, 2) 0
(0, 1)
(0, 0) 1
2
(cos θ
2
sin pi
8
+ sin θ
2
cos pi
8
)2
(0, 1) 1
2
(cos θ
2
cos pi
8
− sin θ
2
sin pi
8
)2
(0, 2) 0
(1, 0) 1
2
(cos θ
2
sin pi
8
− sin θ
2
cos pi
8
)2
(1, 1) 1
2
(cos θ
2
cos pi
8
+ sin θ
2
sin pi
8
)2
(1, 2) 0
(1, 0)
(0, 0) cos2 pi
8
cos2 θ
2
(0, 1) sin2 pi
8
cos2 θ
2
(0, 2) 0
(1, 0) sin2 pi
8
sin2 θ
2
(1, 1) cos2 pi
8
sin2 θ
2
(1, 2) 0
(1, 1)
(0, 0) sin2 pi
8
cos2 θ
2
(0, 1) cos2 pi
8
cos2 θ
2
(0, 2) 0
(1, 0) cos2 pi
8
sin2 θ
2
(1, 1) sin2 pi
8
sin2 θ
2
(1, 2) 0
when Bob measures the first particle as |1〉, the second particle collapses to |φ1〉. In this case the probabilities of
getting |0′〉, |1′〉 and |2′〉 are given in figure III.
J. Case 2: (x=0, y=1)
Bob measures his first particle in {|0〉 , |1〉} basis and second particle in {|0′′〉 , |1′′〉 ,
|2′′〉} basis. This case is similar to case 1. Conditional probabilities Pr(a, b|0, 1) are shown in figure III.
K. Case 3: (x=1, y=0)
Bob measures his first particle in {|+〉 , |−〉} basis and second particle in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 ,
|2′〉} basis. When he measures the first particle in {|+〉 , |−〉} basis he gets |+〉 with probability 12 . cos2 θ and |−〉 with
probability 12 (1+sin
2 θ). In the first case, the second particle collapses to 1√
2
(|i〉+ |i+ 1〉). And in the second case, the
second particle collapses to 1√
2(1+sin2 θ)
(− cos θ |i〉+cos θ |i+ 1〉+2 sin θ |i+ 2〉). Now, Bob measures the second particle
in {|0′〉 , |1′〉 , |2′〉} basis. In the first case, he gets |0′〉 with probability 12 cos2 θ(cos pi8 + sin pi8 )2, |1′〉 with probability
1
2 cos
2 θ(sin pi8 − cos pi8 )2 and never gets |2′〉. For the second case, Bob obtains |0′〉 with probability 12 cos2 θ(sin pi8 −
cos pi8 )
2, |1′〉 with probability 12 cos2 θ(cos pi8 +sin pi8 )2 and |2′〉 with probability sin2 θ. All these conditional probabilities
Pr(a, b|1, 0) are shown in figure III.
L. Case 4: (x=1, y=1)
Bob measures his first particle in {|+〉 , |−〉} basis and second particle in {|0′′〉 , |1′′〉 ,
|2′′〉} basis. This case is similar to case 3. Conditional probabilities Pr(a, b|1, 1) are shown in figure III.
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TABLE III: Conditional probability of (a, b) given (x, y) for entangled states with sub-systems in different subspaces
(x, y) (a, b) Pr ((a, b) | (x, y))
(0, 0)
(0, 0) 1
2
cos2 θ sin2 pi
8
(0, 1) 1
2
cos2 θ cos2 pi
8
(0, 2) 1
2
sin2 θ
(1, 0) 1
2
cos2 θ cos2 pi
8
(1, 1) 1
2
cos2 θ sin2 pi
8
(1, 2) 1
2
sin2 θ
(0, 1)
(0, 0) 1
2
cos2 θ cos2 pi
8
(0, 1) 1
2
cos2 θ sin2 pi
8
(0, 2) 1
2
sin2 θ
(1, 0) 1
2
cos2 θ sin2 pi
8
(1, 1) 1
2
cos2 θ cos2 pi
8
(1, 2) 1
2
sin2 θ
(1, 0)
(0, 0) 1
4
cos2 θ(cos pi
8
+ sin pi
8
)2
(0, 1) 1
4
cos2 θ(sin pi
8
− cos pi
8
)2
(0, 2) 0
(1, 0) 1
4
cos2 θ(sin pi
8
− cos pi
8
)2
(1, 1) 1
4
cos2 θ(cos pi
8
+ sin pi
8
)2
(1, 2) sin2 θ
(1, 1)
(0, 0) 1
4
cos2 θ(cos pi
8
+ sin pi
8
)2
(0, 1) 1
4
cos2 θ(sin pi
8
− cos pi
8
)2
(0, 2) 0
(1, 0) 1
4
cos2 θ(sin pi
8
− cos pi
8
)2
(1, 1) 1
4
cos2 θ(cos pi
8
+ sin pi
8
)2
(1, 2) sin2 θ
